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PROTECTION OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS AGAINST
INTERFERENCE BY INDIVIDUALS
The cause of civil rights received a new impetus in an
almost unforeseen direction in 1950 by way of a new inter-
pretation of an old statute. In the case of Hardyman v.
Collins,' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in the
majority opinion by Judge Orr, interpreted see. 2 (3) of
the Civil Rights Act of 18712 as giving a federal cause of
action for damages against individuals who deprived the
plaintiffs of certain privileges of United States Citizens.
In the principal case, the plaintiffs were members of the
Crescenta-Canada Democratic Club, an affiliate of the Dem-
ocratic Party of Los Angeles County, California, and were
holding a meeting for the avowed purpose of discussing the
Marshall Plan and for sending a petition to the President
and to various members of Congress expressing their oppo-
sition to the plans. Defendants, members of the American
Legion, allegedly conspired to break up the meeting and
thus prevented transmission of the proposed resolution,
and did several acts in furtherance of this conspiracy.
1 Hardyman v. Collins, 183 F.2d 308 (9th Mr.) (1950), cert. granted
19 L.W. 3085 (Oct. 9, 1950).
2 17 Stat. 13, codified in 8 U.S.C. sec. 47 (3): "If two or more persons
in any State or Territory conspire or go in disg-ise on the highway. or
on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of 'he equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for
the purpose of preventing or hindering t-ie constituted authorities of
any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or
more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any
citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or
advocacy in a legal manner, to or in favor of the election of any law-
fully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or
as a member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen
in person or property on account of such advocacy; in case of conspiracy
set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do,
or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such con-
spiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or de-
prived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against any one or more of the conspirators."
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Among the acts charged were entering the building where
the meeting was taking place and, with force and threats of
violence, dispersing the persons attending, whereby the
plaintiffs allegedly were precluded from adopting the reso-
lution-and thus deprived of their constitutional right as
citizens of the United States to petition the President and
the Congress for redress of grievances.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a federal cause of action, on the ground that recovery
under section 2 (3) of the Civil Rights Act demands that
the acts be done under color of law.8 The dismissal was
reversed in the Court of Appeals, which held that the acts
alleged came within the statute.4 Judge Healy dissented,
arguing that the District Court was correct in its interpre-
tation of the statute, and adding that the construction placed
on the statute by the majority rendered even the constitu-
tionality of the statute somewhat dubious.
The four major questions involved in determining the
proper outcome of this case seems to be:
I. Does Congress have the power to protect rights "in-
herent in national citizenship" by authorizing a civil action
against individuals who deprive citizens of their rights?
II. If so, is the right to assemble to petition Congress for
redress of grievances within this category of rights?
IH. Did Congress exercise this power in enacting sec.
2 (3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and if so, what situa-
tions did it intend to cover.
IV. If Congress intended to protect against individual
action rights guaranteed only by the Fourteenth Amend-
men as well as those "inherent in national citizenship," is
the section unconstitutional as being too broad and instp-
arable?
I. The Power of Congress
In the early decades after the adoption of the Fourteenth
£ Hardyman v. Collins, 80 F.Supp. 501 (S. D. Cal. 1949).
'See note 1, aupra.
Id. at p. 314.
* United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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Amendment, it was established by the Cruikshank,6 Harris,7
and Civil Rights8 cases that the Amendment gave Congress
power to protect the rights guaranteed therein only against
state action, and this doctrine is now well established. The
Fourteenth Amendment, however, is not the basis on which
the majority in the Court of Appeals decision rely in their
argument for upholding the constitutionality of the statute.
Judge Orr does not rest his argument that Congress has the
power to enact such statute on any particular section of the
Constitution other than to say that he does base it on the
Constitution as it existed prior to the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment. He apparently bases his conclusion on
the fact that the United States is a sovereign nation with a
republican form of government; therefore, it must protect,
against whatever might destroy them, those rights of citi-
zens which are necessary for the proper functioning of the
Republic.
That Congress has the power to protect certain rights of
citizens against deprivation by individuals is a well estab-
lished doctrine that dates back to a period before the Four-
teenth Amendment. In 1867, a federal right of access to
the nation's capital was recognized and protected by the
Supreme Court. Although the 1867 decision held that a
state could not infringe this right, only the Fourteenth
Amendment requires state action, and that amendment was
not in existence at the time.9 This doctrine has since been
expounded by the numerous cases applying sec. 241 of the
Criminal Code,'10 which makes it a criminal offense for two
or more persons to conspire or to go in disguise on the high-
ways, or on another's premises "to injure, oppress, threat-
en, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoy-
ment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States . . ."10 This "right
or privilege" has been held to include the right to be secure
in one's person while in the custody of a United States Mar-
7 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
8 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 327 (1883).
9 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1867).
20 18 U.S.C. sec. 241, a codification of the criminal portion of sec. 2
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (17 Stat. 13).
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shal,1 the right to inform a marshal of a violation of federal
law, 12 and the right to vote in federal elections.'3 The right
peaceably to assemble is protected against state action,14 but
not against individual action, 5 at least, unless the assembly
is for a federal purpose, a possibility to be discussed later.5
In view of the interpretations and applications of the
criminal statute discussed above, Congress undoubtedly has
the power to enact a statute imposing civil liability as to
the rights already protected by criminal sanctions.
IL Inherent Right To Petition Congress
It has been held that the right peaceably to assemble is
an incident of state citizenship, not of federal, and there-
fore the-federal government lacks the power to protect this
right against individual action,17 although; under the Four-
teenth Amendment, it can protect the right against action
taken under color of state law.'8 Does the fact that the pur-
pose of the assembly was to petition Congress for redress
of grievances change the right from an incident of state
citizenship to one of federal? Hague v. C.1.O.1' contains
dicta to the effect that such a purpose does give rise to a
federal right. 'The Cruizsimsha case, while holding that the
right to assemble in and of itself is a right only of state
citizenship, says in part:
1 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); although It does not
include the right to be secure In person while In the custody of a sheriff,
United States v. Harris, see note 7, aupra, unless the deprivation of
rights ls "under color of law" so as to invoke the FourteenthAmend-
ment, Screws v. United States; 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
*3 In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
U2Ex arte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); but not state elections,,
for this Is an element of state sovereignty rather than national, so the
deprivation must have been under color of state law to give the Court
Jurisdiction, Snowden v. Hughes, 821 U.S. 1 (1944).
2' Hague v. Congress for Industrial Organizations, 307 U.S. 496(1939).
Is See note 6, upra.
2" See Sec. II, infra.
" See note 6, 8up1.
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
" Seaw note 14, Mpra.
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The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the
purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of griev-
ances ... is an attribute of national citizenship, and,
as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by,
the United States. The very idea of a. government,
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs and to petition for a redress of griev-
ances.2o
Thus, dicta from two cases, one of them very explicit, say
that the right of which the plaintiffs claim to have been
deprived is within that area of rights that Congress can
protect against individual action. The argument seems
sound, and there is no apparent reason why this is not as
much a federal right as those protected in the cases apply-
ing sec. 241 of the Criminal Code.21 There being no con-
trary holding, it seems that this right is within the favored
class.
HI. Intent of Congress As To Rights Covered
and Power Exerted
It is highly improbable that Congress could have intended
that this statute22 apply only to state action. The subsection
begins "If two or more persons .. .conspire", and thus
makes no qualification that the persons must be exercising
state powers, nor does it mention that the acts must be done
under color of state law to come within its compass. This
suggests that no such requirement was intended, especially
since the immediately preceding section of the Civil Rights
Act does apply only to state action, and requires in so many
words that the deprivations be under color of law.23. A
further indication of the "intent of Congress is the phrase
"for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State or Territory from giving . . .equal
protection of the laws ... " Congress scarcely intended
"See note 6, oupra.
n See notes 11-15, supra and text to which they refer.
" The revelant subsection is quoted in footnote 2, as it appears in
8 U.S.C. sec. 47(3).
"17 Stat. 13, see, 1, codified in 8 U.S.C. sec. 47 (2).
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to prohibit only the state from interfering with the "con-
stituted authorities of any State" in its attempt to secure
equal protection of the laws for all within the borders of
the state; this phrase could have meaning only if it applies
to individual action, and there is nothing in the subsection
involved in the principal case to indicate that a different
application was intended for it.
The dissenting judge in the principal case does not argue
that Congress did not intend to authorize action against
individuals--especially in the light of the then-prevailing
idea among the legislators that the Fourteenth Amendment
gave Congress power to protect the rights guaranteed there-
in against individual action-but he feels that, despite Con-
gressional intent, Congress failed by the words of the statute
to cover action other than that under color of state law.24
He argues that under the interpretation of the word "de-
prived" laid out in the Civil Rights Cases, an individual
cannot deprive another of any rights unless he does so under
the shield of state. authority, and that the most he can do
on his own is to interfre# with the enjoyment of that right,
or commit a trespass or an assault, etc. The latter two be-
ing exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state courts
and- the first (interfering) not being within the wording of
the statute, Judge Healy feels that no cause of action is
maintainable in the federal courts.25
Aside from the argument based on the technical meaning
of the word "deprived" when used in the statute, the major-
ity opinion still was not as convincing as it might have
been. The principal case is in direct conflict with decisions
of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits,26 which hold that sec.
47 (3) authorizes suit for damages only where the depriva-
tion of rights has been under color of law. Judge Orr:in
writing. for the majority adverts to these two cases and
their holdings, but-says that they (and apparently no other
Appellate Court cases have construed this particular section,
24 See note 1, supra, p. 315.
0 Id., see quotation from Civil Rights Cases at page 316.
' Love v. Chandler, 124 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1942); Viles v. Symes,
129 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1942); see also Bomar v. Bogart, 159 P.2d 338
(2d Cr. 1947).
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certainly none have reached the Supreme Court) 27 were
decided erroneously. He argues that the construction placed
on the section in these decisions is contrary to that which
the Supreme Court placed on "similar wording" in the
Harris case,28 thus placing himself in the anomalous posi-
tion of supporting his construction with a case which held
that the "similar" statute there construed was unconstitu-
tional. The Harris holding, however, does answer the argu-
ment of the dissent in the principal case that the use of
the word "deprive" makes it impossible for individuals not
acting under color of the law to come within the wording
of sec. 47 (3), since the statute there held to be unconstitu-
tional-because it purported to punish individuals for de-
priving citizens of rights guaranteed only by the Fourteenth
Amendment-also used the word "deprived. '29
In view of the apparet intent of Congress, and the de-
cision in the Harris case, which seems to answer Judge
Healy's argument, it seems fairly certain that the statute
in terms applies to individual action. Whether or not the
statute should be declared unconstitutional within the
reasoning of the Harris case will be discussed later.8 0
Although it is apparent that Congress intended to cover
individual action, it would seem equally apparent that Con-
gress intended to exercise the powers granted by section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The original statute from
which sec. 47 (3) was taken was entitled "An Act to Enforce
The Fourteenth Amendment," though it is more commonly
known as the "Civil Rights Act of 1871," 17 Stat. 13. The
wording of the statute itself in many places fairly closely
follows that of the Amendment.
Robeson v. Fanelli, 19 L.W. 2237 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 10, 1950), cites
the Hardyman case and offers dictum to the effect that the right to
assemble may be protected by Congress if the assembly is only to discuss
national affairs. This would seem to extend the Hardyman doctrine,
but It remains dictum, since the case was decided on other grounds.
The Court specifically refused to decide whether or not individuals
were capable of depriving citizens of their rights, viz., one of the main
points of the dissenter's argument in the Hardyman case.
See note 7, supra.
Revised Statutes, sec. 5519.
10 The Harris case held the statute there construed to be unconstitu-
tional because it covered rights that Congress lacked power to protect
against individual action, and the provisions were inseparable.
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Of course the constitutional authority under which Con-
gress sought to act is irrevelant in passing on the validity
of the statute, since the statute will stand if Congress has
any power which would support it. As Justice Douglas
said in Woods v. Miller Co., "The question of the constitu-
tionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on
recitals of the powers which it undertakes to exercise." 1
However, the power Congress intended to exercise does be-
come relevant in determining the scope of the statute.
While in some instances, the words of a statute may be
narrowed by a recital of the power under which Congress
purported to act, here they seem to be broadened.
The Supreme Court's conclusion in the Harris case that
another provision in the same section of the Civil Rights
Act covered all Fourteenth Amendment rights--and cov-
ered them against individual action-led to that provision's
being declared unconstitutional. Therefore, it is hard to
argue that Fourteenth Amendment rights are not covered
by the "similar" damages provision of the same section.
Moreover, the clause "whereby another is injured in his
person or property," which appears in the damages pro-
vision-the provision construed in the principal case-
seems to go far beyond those rights held to be essential to
the maintenance of a republican form of government.
The section requires that the deprivation result from acts
done "in the furtherance of conspiracy set forth in this
section." Among the conspiracies specified82 is one to de-
prive any person "of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws." Thus the
conspiracy requirement. of the damages section would seem
to be fulfilled by a'conspiracy to deprive persons of rights
guaranteed only by the Fourteenth Amendment; and so
some provisions in this section clearly seem unconstitu-
tional.
8 Woods v. Miller Company, 333 U.S. 138 (1948), at page 144.
2 The section also mentions a conspiracy to injure anyone entitled
to vote, in person or property, because of advocacy of a candidate for
Presidential Elector or Congressman, so It Is arguable that this con-
spitacy Is required to satisfy the conspiracy requirement of the dam-
ages section.
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IV. Severability
The only way to uphold the principal case would seem to
be by application of the doctrine of separability. The al-
ternative of supporting the statute under the Fourteenth
Amendment is precluded by a long line of cases establishing
the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment only pro-
hibits state action-however liberally that doctrine of state
action is construed.88
What test should be applied as to separability? Every
attempt of the Court and writers to formulate a rule has
failed. United States v. Reese stated that the Court could
eliminate portions of a statute that were unconstitutional
and save the rest under certain circumstances; but the hold-
ing was that broad language, including both rights within
the power of Congress to protect and rights which were not
within such tower, could not be limited so as to include only
the unobjectionable part, the entire statute therefore being
invalid.84 The Harris case, following this proposition, in-
validated in toto section 5519 of the Revised Statutes (also
a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871) because 'the
penalties were imposed for deprivation of rights-for con-
spiracy, and action in furtherance of that conspiracy, to
deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immuni-
ties . . ."--which could not constitutionally be protected
against action not under color of law. The Court refused
to limit the statute to those rights which Congress could
validly protect. Among its reasons the Court suggested
that in a criminal statute the offense must be outlined spe-
cifically; a clarification by judicial decision-necessarily
retroactive-would not conform to this policy of adequate
notice of the limits of the crime. On the other hand, a 1912
decision interpreted a regulatory statute prohibiting sale of
certain sponges anywhere in the United States as applying
only'to sponges involved in interstate commerce, and. thus,
" This Is true even though the Fourteenth Amendment is capable
of being construed so as not to require state action, If it were an original
question. See: Flack, Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendient (1908).
" United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
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by astute judicial construction, preserved the constitution-
ality of the statute.P
An exhaustive treatment of separability is offered by
Stern, who writes:
"..- the invalidity of part of a law or of some of its
applications will not affect the remainder (1) if the
valid provisions or applications are capable of being
given legal effect standing alone, and (2) if the legis-
lature would have intended them to stand with the in-
valid provisions stricken out." 6
"The test for severability clearly must be whether the
legislature would have intended the valid parts or ap-
plications of a statute to stand if it had known when
the law was enacted of the invalidity of the remain-
der." 7
Under this test the question is whether Congress would
have passed the section, here under consideration had it
known at the time that it lacked the power to protect from
individual action the rights. which, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, may be protected from state action. The an-
swer seems obvious. Accordingly, under this test as to
separability, the statute, so far as it is involved in the prin-
cipal case, is constitutional-a result effectuating the intent
of Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act to protect such
rights against deprivation from any source and to cover the
field as far as possible.
The provisions here in question do not, so much as penal
statutes, fall within the policy insisting on specific notice
of the acts creating liability. Moreover, they do not come
within the holding of the Reese and Harris cases, since here
severability of the unconstitutional portions can be easily
accomplished by deleting the clause "whereby another is
injured in person or property." The portion of the section
applied in Hardyman v. Collins, "deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States," has already been limited by Congress to an area
where Congressional power exists. Therefore, Congress
M The Abbey Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1912).
n Stem, Separabilty and BeparabiUty laue in the Supreme 7ourt,
51 Harvard L. Rev. 76. See also, Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).
I Id, page 98.
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has validly exercised this power to protect rights necessary
to the existence of a republican form of government, a power
conferred by the "necessary and proper" clause of Art. I,
sec. 8 of the Constitution.
V. Conclusion
There exists a narrow area of rights "inherent in national
citizenship" because they are necessary for the efficient
operation of a republican form of government; these rights
Congress has the power to protect against action by indi-
viduals. Among these rights is that of assembly for the
purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances.
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, it intended
to authorize an action for damages against individuals who
had deprived citizens of their rights as citizens of the United
States. Although Congress also intended to protect rights
which it lacks power to protect against individual action,
the portion of the statute utilized in the principal case is
valid, as the provisions are severable.
As to policy factors, Judge Healy, in his dissent, seems to
be unduly alarmed over the prospect that the federal courts
will be packed with cases that he feels should be left to the
states. Of course, already one case has, by way of dicta,
extended the rights necessary to a republican form of gov-
ernment to include the right to assemble to discuss national
affairs, on the ground that such assembly is a preliminary
to formulation of petitions for redress of grievances.3 8
Theoretically, the' idea of rights essential to a republican
government could be extended to include almost all personal
rights, a development that would parallel the amplification
-also in theory almost illimitable39-- of state action for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Several well-
established authorities, however, seem to preclude such an
extension. Therefore, affirmance of the Harymctn v. Col-
lins decision would probably bring about only a slight in-
crease in litigation, a few suits by persons who either would
be hesitant to press criminal charges, or who wish compen-
U See note 27, 8upra.
1 Of. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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sation as well as the gratification of a successful prosecution.
Yet, who can say that these additional suits would be un-
healthy? And perhaps they might produce a more com-
plete enforcement of section 241 of the Criminal Code, as
well as provide a federal remedy for this type of wrong(possibly not needed so much in Los Angeles County as in
other places") where, as in many instances, all state reme-
dies are inadequate.
JAMES E. THOMPSON.
4Hardyman v. Collins, see note 1, supra, at page 319, dissenting
opinion. The "Incident occurred In La Crescenta, a sizeable suburb of
the City of Los Angeles. One hardly need say that the Los Angeles
community is Justly celebrated for Its tolerance of all sorts and con-
ditions of people and IdeaL The hospitality of the community embraces
not merely the conformist, the respectable and the truly good, but the
proponents of practically every Ism under the sun."
